Security Incidents Data for Organizations: Balancing Reality and Distortion of Legitimate Government Image (Analysis, Classification, Risks, and Procedures)

October 8, 2023 – FraudWiki

#لن_نصمت #وين_الفلوس

The leaked security incident data, which appear to depict incidents occurring between 2022 and 2023, are a source of concern for the legitimate government in Yemen. Analysis and classification of these data indicate that the main purpose of their publication is to tarnish the image of legitimacy and justify the continued presence of certain organizations in specific areas under the authority of the Houthi militia.

FraudWiki obtained these reports (annexed), which are detailed data in an Excel file prepared by organizations in Yemen (UN for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – OCHA) that includes 404 security incidents that organizations claim to have been exposed to during the period (2022-2023 ), and it seems that such reports were submitted annually without the knowledge of the legitimate government or without reviewing them and verifying the validity of the listed information, and thus working to verify and correct it and work to take protection measures and coordination between legitimate government agencies and organizations, Also, hold these organizations accountable in the event that this information is false, misleading, fabricated and distorts the situation in the areas controlled by the legitimacy.

It is observed that this data aligns with numerous reports submitted by organizations or entities working with them, including organizations and institutions operating in the field of peace, training on peace concepts, and fostering a peace-promoting environment in the legitimate territories. These reports portray the Houthi militia as ready for peace, asserting they require no additional training. They present Houthi-controlled areas as characterized by security and stability, contrasting with the situation in the legitimate areas. Consequently, we find that these peace-oriented initiatives, benefiting specific institutions and a select few individuals, are primarily directed towards regions under the control of the legitimate government. This sends a message to the world, especially the Western audience, suggesting that these areas are not conducive to peace and are grappling with chaos, insecurity, and instability, necessitating further training and conditioning. This implies a diversion of funds to specific entities. The report presented here conducts an analysis and categorization of the leaked data, elucidates associated risks, and proposes a series of measures.

Analysis and Classification of Data:

Through the leaked data and the process of its analysis and classification, the following findings were obtained:

All the governorates listed are under the authority of the legitimate government, and the majority of the incidents are classified within directorates under its authority. However, some mentioned directorates fall under the authority of the Houthi militia in the governorates of Hodeidah, Al-Bayda, and Taiz..
The largest percentage of accidents, up to 95%, occurred in directorates under the authority of the legitimate government.
Accidents are distributed among the following governorates:
- Taiz with 112 security incidents (95% of which are in districts under the authority of the legitimacy).
- Hodeidah with 69 security incidents (80% of which are in districts under the authority of the legitimacy).
- Lahj with 56 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
- Marib with 46 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
- Aden with 41 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of legitimacy.
- He was involved in 33 security incidents, all of them in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
- Abyan with 20 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
- Hadramout with 11 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of legitimacy.
- They resembled 3 security incidents, all in areas under the authority of the legitimacy.
- Al-Mahra has only one security incident.
- Al-Bayda with 11 security incidents in areas under the authority of the Houthi militia.

Security incidents can also be classified into 11 main categories, under which according to the data detailed classifications fall, as follows:

Threats against humanitarian workers in 30 incidents.
Abduction or abduction of humanitarian equipment/workers in 75 incidents.
Movement restriction with 60 incidents.
Activities suspended with 13 incidents.
Looting of humanitarian goods in 5 incidents.
Restriction of population movement in 3 incidents.
Confiscation of goods in 2 incidents.
Mines or unexploded ordnance in 40 incidents.
Shelling (military operations that impede humanitarian work) with 125 incidents
Damage to humanitarian goods or buildings in 11 incidents.
Crimes that may include car theft or shooting in 40 incidents.

Risks to the Legitimate Government:

These reports and confidential data being submitted by organizations, depicting legitimate areas as chaotic, convey a message implying that these legitimate areas are unstable, experiencing conflicts, looting, and hindrance of organizational operations. This is utilized to justify the retention of their main offices by the Houthi militia, as well as to keep financial transfers away from the central bank in Aden and to avoid activating monitoring and accountability.

Furthermore, this volume and nature of security incidents inevitably lead to significant financial expenses, which come at the expense of the share allocated to needy Yemeni families. Organizations may not hesitate to register and allocate these expenses, essentially providing meager aid or even deducting from it. Operational budgets are calculated at more than 50%, and in some projects, they reach up to 70%. Registering this number of incidents may be a target for fund diversion, again at the expense of aid to Yemenis.

Analysis of this data also indicates alignment with peacebuilding programs, which singularly target areas under legitimacy. This narrative implies that residents of these areas reject peace, in contrast to the Houthi-controlled regions that are perceived as ready for peace. Consequently, millions of dollars in funding are directed through a number of institutions such as the European Institute for Peace, the Sana’a Center for Studies, Deep Root, and its program Jusoor. These institutions are primarily focused on the areas under legitimacy, and a majority of their programs involve webinars and external participations by individuals who interchange roles to serve the Houthi militia and distort the image of legitimacy, depicting these areas as chaotic and in need of a deeper understanding of the meaning of peace. Additionally, this aims to weaken the image of the legitimate government in the Western world and globally. It is noteworthy that these funds are seized by a limited number of institutions, aligning with UN organizations, agencies in Yemen, and the European Union, yet failing to truly benefit the people.

Actions Needed:

It is crucial to conduct an investigation to ascertain the veracity of all these incidents and determine the extent of their occurrence. This investigation should also inquire about the involvement of security agencies, both within the legitimate government in Aden and at the provincial level. Are the security agencies aware of these incidents, and do they possess information that contradicts or refutes these reports? Are there statistics or records available to challenge these reports? Additionally, it’s important to investigate if the security agencies have details regarding data from previous years and whether organizations are mandated to provide any data or reports for review.

The observer of this data is profoundly shocked upon reading it, as it signifies the actual presence of chaos and instability. It starkly highlights the severity of the situation, revealing, on average, that these organizations face a security incident every two days. This underscores the urgent need to verify the accuracy of the data and implement robust monitoring, accountability, and event tracking measures. These measures should not be limited to areas under legitimacy but should encompass the entire Yemeni territory. Therefore, the recommended actions are as follows:

Resetting the relationship with international organizations and UN agencies
Activating mechanisms for coordination, monitoring, and accountability for these organizations and the entities operating under them.
Mandating that all international funding be channeled through the Central Bank in Aden and highlighting its positive effects on the national economy.
Reactivating the electronic monitoring and oversight system for projects that were operational before the war, linking the Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, organizations, and project executive units in the provinces.
Not releasing any reports or data from organizations without first reviewing and approving them by the relevant legitimate government authorities.
Holding accountable government officials in the legitimate government and making changes with qualified personnel who are nationally committed to reforming the situation and directing funding in a way that benefits Yemenis.
Holding international organizations and UN agencies accountable, inquiring about previous amounts, which have reached 25 billion dollars since 2015, and requesting all previous reports on security situations and others for review and verification.
Enforcing control over both local and internationally registered institutions operating in the relief and peace projects sector in Yemen, as well as engaging with international organizations or funders for training purposes. This involves mandatory registration, comprehensive reporting, and holding them accountable for past fund utilization. Any actions that have negatively impacted Yemeni society, damaged the image of legitimacy globally, or exploited the suffering and challenges faced by Yemenis for personal gain must be thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, there is concern about potential fund manipulation through role exchanges among a limited number of entities.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this report sheds light on the importance of addressing the risks associated with the manipulation of security incident data by organizations, posing a threat to the legitimate government. These risks include tarnishing the image of the legitimate government and undermining the confidence of international donors, thereby strengthening the Houthis’ justification for maintaining their offices and operations without oversight and accountability.

A range of effective measures are recommended to mitigate these risks, including restructuring relations with international organizations and UN agencies to enhance coordination and transparency. Coordination, follow-up, monitoring and accountability mechanisms for relevant organizations and institutions should also be activated. All international funding should be required to be deposited in the Central Bank of Aden to strengthen financial management. The electronic project control and follow-up system should also be reactivated. Moreover, reports or statements from organizations should only be submitted after reviewing them and obtaining Approval of the legitimate government. Officials must be held accountable and changes in government cadres must be made. International organizations and UN agencies must also be held accountable and the amounts that have reached $25 billion since 2015 must be restored. Clear controls and standards should be established for local and external institutions working in the field of relief and development in Yemen, with careful monitoring and effective accountability. These measures aim to enhance transparency and accountability and ensure optimal access to humanitarian assistance for Yemenis.

Annexes: 20 lists of 404 security incidents for the period 2022-2023